February 24, 2013 Heather Ridge Avalanche

I wrote most of the below when I got home Sunday evening.  I waited to post it until I had sign-off from all of my partners that day.  Feel free to tell me what a dumbass I am, as long as you can also help me learn from this.  My partners are good people and we all know we share some responsibility for this incident, but I took it upon myself to write it up and I was the one most affected by it.  We are all interested in learning whatever we can from this incident.

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Today is Sunday, 2/24/2013.  I'm writing this in the hope of learning more and helping others who might need the lesson to learn something also.

I welcome comments and input, especially on any aspects of our decision making process that you think I haven't addressed below.  My goal is to never have something like this happen again.   I fully realize how fortunate I am and the price I'm paying is far lower than it could have been.  I never want to do something to endanger my friends or myself again.

We have been in a cold storm cycle for the last few days with about 30" of new snow showing up on the telemetry at Stevens Pass since Wednesday.  Freezing levels have remained low though temps have gotten warmish (upper 20s @ 4K’) during the day and there were some gusty winds up to 55mph or so from the S - SW Thursday night into Friday morning and again Friday night into Saturday morning.

The Northwest Avalanche Center (www.nwac.us) predicted "Considerable" danger at elevations above 4000' today with the main danger being wind slabs and the danger level trending upwards as a warm front moves into the area this evening.  The weather was cloudy but calm with a freezing fog that was creating a thin ice layer in more open/exposed areas at higher elevations.
There were 4 skiers and two dogs in our party.  Our goal was to ski the sheltered N. facing aspects off Skyline Ridge.  It's become one of our go-to places on days when lots of snow has fallen but conditions are sketchy.  This area is sheltered well from winds and there are lots of large old-growth trees that help prevent the formation of slabs underneath them and provide good anchors.   Our intended route is shown in red on the map. 

I'm pretty familiar with this area, but obviously not familiar enough.  Our first mistake was getting off-route and this is my fault as I led us up the wrong trail and we ended up following the blue route as I thought we needed to follow the skin track to the right when it split.  Upon gaining the radio tower at the edge of the ridge we began climbing the ridgeline in a more Northerly direction as I knew we'd missed the saddle and it was off in that direction.  Eventually we came to a place where the ridgeline leveled out a bit and I wasn't sure where we were as I didn't have a GPS and it was foggy/cloudy so I couldn't see any landmarks.  I thought we had come over much farther than we had and were now just above the saddle, the area was heavily treed and we could see good lines down through them. 

I dug a pit (indicated by the first yellow diamond along our route) down to the thick crust from last week's warm rain and found nothing reactive or concerning.  Nothing popped on a compression test and I had to whack the shovel pretty hard with a straight arm from the shoulder to get the column to collapse which it did by crumbling under the shovel, no shearing at all.
We skied down through the trees and it was pretty nice.  Deep, dense pow and nothing moving or making us suspicious.  As we went down we could hear traffic on the highway below and knew we were off-route.  We came out of the trees onto the more open slopes to the North somewhere around the 4400-4600' level and as we were down out of the clouds we could see across the valley and we knew right where we were again.  The snow was skiing great here and we'd seen nothing to indicate poor stability so we decided to skin back up to the ridgeline and ski the more open slopes we found ourselves on.  I believe this area is known as Moonlight Basin.

About 2/3 of the way up I decided to dig another pit (second yellow diamond on our route) as we were now out of the trees on more open and possibly wind-affected slopes and on a different aspect.  Again, the compression test looked great.  Nothing popped and the column collapsed first from a vertical fracture in the top 6” after 4 or 5 hard whacks with a straight arm - there didn't appear to be anything that wanted to shear here and there were no discernible layers until you got down to the previous week's thick crust.  In hindsight that fracture in the top 6” probably indicated the propensity for crack propagation but considering the force I put into it, that it was in the top 6”, and that we’d seen no cracking or other bad signs during our skin up, it didn’t concern me.  This is where I made the second mistake - I assumed that a pit dug only a couple hundred feet below the ridgeline indicated good stability on the entire slope.  In hindsight I'm reminded of the truism that a pit only shows you the conditions at that specific point.

We finished our climb to the ridgeline and began de-skinning.  Another mistake made here - I assumed that because I was the last one to the ridge that everyone else was ready to go - they weren't.  I climbed up a bit of a knob to the North of the saddle where the rest of the group was standing, de-skinned, and launched myself off a steep rollover.  Two mistakes made here in rapid succession - skiing over a convexity and not communicating my intentions to the group or waiting until they were ready to go.  I got down to just about the bottom of the knob (maybe 10' below where'd I'd dropped in), turned to my right and saw the crack shoot out ahead of me and about 2-3' above me.   I could see that I was at the very upper edge of the slide and tried to continue traversing, hoping it would run out from under me but of course it didn't.  It knocked me over, head downhill, onto my stomach.  My legs were bent at the knees and my head was above the snow and the ride began.  I paddled with my arms, trying to keep my head up and I also kept my legs bent in the hopes that if I did get buried maybe one of them would be sticking up out of the snow.  I didn’t want my skis getting down into the snow but the snow caught the tip of my left ski and rolled that leg underneath me, wrenching my left knee.  At about this time my left shoulder which is in pretty sad shape and has dislocated several times in the last year dislocated again.  I kept paddling and it seemed to be working until my submerged leg pulled me around and I lost sight of the sky and figured I was in for a burial.  Then I stopped.  My best guess is that I was at about the 4800-4900' level. 
I raised my head and was looking back up at my partners who were still standing on the edge of the ridge.  They didn’t even realize I’d been caught in an avalanche at first because the fracture didn’t reach all the way over to their position and their view of the top of the slope and the crown was obscured by the knob I’d climbed up.  My left leg was twisted under me but my right leg was mostly free and I managed to completely free it.  Other than the left leg I was basically on top of the snow.  However, with my left shoulder suffering a posterior dislocation and my left leg twisted up under me I couldn't move much or reach far enough back to release my right ski.  I called out to my partners and they quickly came to my aid, freeing my feet then two of them worked to get the shoulder back in as I was unable to do it myself while the third took pictures of the crown and slide path. 

My left knee had no stability and wouldn't bear much weight but I was able to get my skis back on and side-stepped and side-slipped the fall line all the way back down to the Pacific Crest Trail with my partners mashing the snow down ahead of me to make it easier to slide on and me basically skiing on one ski with the left one along for the ride.  Once at the PCT we skinned back to the parking lot.

The crown of this slide is about 2' tall and only went about 20' out in front of me to the South but went easily 100-150' behind me to the North and propagated in some trees further East.  The slide ran for approximately 800' vertical and about 1000’ long to just below where we had initially come out onto the slope.  There's a bench and line of small trees there and that stopped the last of it from going any further.  The picture with the ski pole in it shows the crown approximately 400’ downslope from the highest point.


We've talked about this amongst ourselves and I think these are the mistakes we agree were made.  I'm interested to hear what others think.

First - not sticking to the original plan and skiing the terrain that we knew had the best chance for stability this day.  When we weren't sure exactly where we were we could have easily skied back down a bit, picked up the trail to Skyline Lake and gotten back on track.

Second – Communication:  One member of the party expressed reservations about the slope but the rest of us were eager to try it out and he didn't press the issue.  He stated, “Why don’t we skin along the ridge to where we skied before in the trees.”  Since a pit was dug, he didn’t press the concern.  When we got to the top I didn’t make sure everyone was on the same page and that everyone was ready to go. One person still had his skins on at that point and the others didn’t realize I was dropping in when I did. I should have made sure everyone was ready and that we were watching each other as we dropped in.

Third - not properly assessing the dangers of the slope we were on.  The second pit I dug showed good stability, and indeed at that point on the slope it was quite stable.  However, up higher along the ridgeline there were fresh cornices and obviously the wind had been moving a lot of snow up there.  We didn’t reassess conditions when we got to the top despite the evidence of a lot of transport and possible slab formation staring us in the face (see the picture of the group standing on the ridgeline).

Fourth – Skiing over an obvious trigger point when stability was less than optimal.  I just had to get up a little higher and hit something a little steeper and the fact I was skiing over a convexity didn’t even enter my thought process.

I know I’m probably overlooking some things here.  There are probably many things that are obvious to the outside observer that we did wrong beyond what’s written.  I welcome any comments that can help us to learn from this incident.

Thanks for taking the time to write this up, and for being willing to share it. It's not easy. I'd expect you'll keep processing what you've learned for a while, so don't be surprised to find your takeaways evolving a bit.

I'll save my observations for later, but it seems like you've got a pretty good idea of what happened. It's rarely one big mistake, but a series of small choices that make the difference.

Thanks for your honest assessment of your trip! I'm relatively new new to the scene and your report of your incedent is extremely helpful. Your reflection on the days events and the factors that led to them is a great reminder that its just as important to check your desicions as it is the snow pack. Invaluable beta, thank you. Glad you made it home safe!

Thanks so much, Will. Such a great incident description and assessment. The most important aspect of TAY is how it is becoming such a resource for these necessary and challenging topics. It is another incident that I will hopefully catalog in my brain on how easy it is to get enthused and let guard down slightly. How fast our decision process morphs. I am also thinking of how many reports come right from traditional high use spots: Moonlight, Phantom, Kendall West, etc. By being willing to share it, you are helping to keep me safer.
I am so glad your injuries are not more serious and hope you heal up soon. Still wondering how we haven't ended up in some parking lot, on some morning, as members of the same party for a day of touring.
Much Appreciated,
John

Thanks for sharing Will - glad you and your party made it out safe.

Whew, that was an intense read, esp. since that is one of my favorite spots. Thanks for sharing, always good for all of us to learn from each others mistakes. Sorry for your injury, but glad it wasn't worse!

Hey Will, glad your alive and I truely hope your injuries aren't too serious. Excellent write up! I read through it twice, and I think you hit all the points very well. The biggest thing that stands out for me is relying on a pit, that as you said only conveys conditions at the that point. I was at Stevens in-bounds with my kids both Sat. & Sun. Sat. the winds was really blowing out of the west, and the top of the backside ridge was heavily wind loaded. I wasn't concerned skiing it as it was well ski cut. I did get a piece of untracked snow about 8' x 16' to easily go with a ski kick just below the ridge. Once down from the ridge a 100', it was fairly well bonded - wind loading. Wind loading is very varible between locations.

I really commend for you for writing this up. As Marcus said, it is a lot a small judgement errors that contribute to these types of incidents, errors that anyone of could easily make. Thanks for your honest account to really drive the lessons home to all of us out here.

Heal up fast!

Glad you're OK Will!  Hope the knee doesn't keep you from skiing for too long!

Thanks for having the courage of honesty, your observations, and writing up the report.

some observations (prompted by your report, but more generally applicable in terms of stability assessment):
R&R - - Ridge lines command Respect. or for that matter, any feature with increased wind and weather exposure (leeward side especially).
Like you said, that first picture tells a story (of recent weather behaviour).
With increased settlement and bonding (depending on conditions) your line may have skied great a day later... which adds an element of time, along with weather and terrain features.  I also think that Mowgli's assessment of "micro-topographic spatial heterogeneity" in the thread where your incident is first mentioned is spot on.  How the complexities of terrain in combination with weather phenomena (wind channeling or sheltering, variability of potential running surface, solar and fog effects, etc.) can make all the difference.

I was telling Charlie and Susan the other day about a tour we did on Presidents Day recently and coming back and reading one of Silas' Snoqualmie Pass reports (N. aspect 5200'-4200' skied great with 12" of fluff; SE had less snow with crust... etc. [details not verbatim but you get the picture] )  and thinking hmmmm, we were in the Snoqualmie Pass vicinity that very same day and yet at least half of our experience was diametrically opposed to what Silas was reporting in terms of aspect and elevation. We found that the N. was crusty and the SE skied great at similiar elevations...
Two truths, but without the specifics of terrain.

In terms of condition reporting nothing (or nobody) can fully report what one will find, not NWAC or NWS.  Conditions can only ever be generally predicted or hinted at--providing a good starting point for every backcountry skiers best friend: real time vigilance and attentiveness to the terrain and conditions one happens to be in.  Especially in the Cascades with its plethora of micro-topographic spatial heterogeneity.

For me each trip is a learning experience.  The other day I was poking around in some wind slab feeling the very visceral difference in density to the surrounding fluffier snow and it made me wonder: how does this happen?  in fact I voiced that to my partner and together we came up with a very visual scenario of wind buffeted six-sided snowflakes being pulverized into less than six-sided entities: decreasing the amount of air in the snowpack and significantly increasing its density, i.e. increasing its weight and impact on any lower layer.
Suddenly 'wind slab' had a story, it's own narrative and life, a story of crippled snowflakes bonding together...
Sure there's probably a more scientific version in a book somewhere, but for me it doesn't become real until my body and imagination are directly engaged with the elements.  Being in the place that will allow me to try and trace that snowflakes path...

Of course none of this addresses lapses in judgement...  which we're all prone to and which seem to be the crux of all avi reports.
Maybe we can learn something from sharing--so thanks for sharing Will!

Great write-up, thanks for sharing Will. Good observations on the need to be cautious about using pit info to tell you how things will be up higher, just below and on the lee side of cornices - that strikes me as a very key point in your writeup (along with choosing a line based on fun versus safety, though this is of course ALWAYS an interesting question of balance and if you swing too far the other way you will never get any turns...).

Regarding navigation, even w/o a GPS, I presume that if you'd had a map/compass handy you could have figured out that you weren't looking down at the slope you thought you were before starting the first run - you'd presumably have had to go past your desired saddle to be facing in the direction that you faced when you started that run. While hardly foolproof, a little map/compass check can be very helpful in nasty weather for sanity checking your assumptions. Just a thought...

Thanks for the write up and glad you are only tweaked a bit. You seem to be aware of the snowpack analysis issues. Folks often fall into the trap of "...well, that last run skied just great, no signs of instability, so lets move over (or up) there".

The plan discussed in the parking lot should be adhered to, unless there is a good reason for changing. Everyone is excited to get out and ski, and it can seem anal to just have a tailgate meeting and say - here's the plan - are we ok with this?

This workshop is tomorrow. I'm going. Don't know what is the ticket availability:
www.nwac.us/media/uploads/pdfs/GoingDeep...ion%20_4_2.28.13.pdf

Good job on the self-rescue.

Third - not properly assessing the dangers of the slope we were on.  The second pit I dug showed good stability, and indeed at that point on the slope it was quite stable.  However, up higher along the ridgeline there were fresh cornices and obviously the wind had been moving a lot of snow up there.  We didn’t reassess conditions when we got to the top despite the evidence of a lot of transport and possible slab formation staring us in the face (see the picture of the group standing on the ridgeline).

This is what stands out to me the most. A re-assurance to continue to look for instability even over a short distance.
This correlates to micro-climates that exist in terrain and storm cycles can affect the snowpack in a very small localized spot.

I appreciate your posting this story, excellent write up.

Thank you. If your impressions of the incident have changed in a few months, please consider posting an epilogue in a few months. Sometimes it can take a few days/weeks to really piece together how things went down.

Heal well - a fully unstable knee sounds worse than a tweak. The seasons are long; you'll get some no matter how long it takes for things to heal.


I'm not sure that there's any way to really avoid the trap that Chamois brings up. "This worked, so let's try something similar" is a rational way to explore. The trick is to temper it in an unknowable way. If you accept that you're going to screw up sometimes, a defense-in-depth strategy helps to mitigate the consequences: www.akavalanches.com/PDFs/04cAllSnowpackIIIStabilityNNotes.pdf

By skiing somewhat apart from the group, it sounds like you arranged for only one party member to be caught in a substantial slide. If the group intended to ski the slope, perhaps by triggering it first, you actually took one for the team.


Thanks again!

Thank you for your write up and glad you come out of it in one piece. One key point, the profiles are not meant to determine go/no go, just assess the status of slabs in the snowpack.

Terrain selection should be done in the planning before going out and reassessment based on conditions and updated hazard. The evidence of wind affect with the Considerable rating link back to the Travel Recommendations, which call for,'...cautious route finding, and conservative decision making essential.' Also the Likelihood of Avalanches, '...human triggered avalanches likely.'

Creating options based on the forecast help select terrain appropriate for the conditions prevent surprises and give the group a margin of safety in their route selection. Here is an example: alpineinstitute.blogspot.com/2009/03/tou...vigation-part-2.html

Heal well!

and launched myself off a steep rollover. 

This is the one line that stands out to me. I am guessing you don't mean literally "catching air" and landing hard, but just jumped in straight down the fall line. Which always is fun btw.

Perhaps a quick ski cut could have prevented the ride. I like ski cutting any area that looks sketchy to me rather then jumping in and assuming my analysis along the way was 100% right.

Just that last second precaution that I have made routine since my second tour in 1985, when my bro and I climbed Alpy in May on a misty day. Made it to the top, got warmed up and dry and while doing that the sun came out. Headed over to Nash and looked at my bro and said mayb a ski cut??? BTW - we are 19 yo kids w/o beacons/shovels/probes cause we don't know better.........yet.

Bro cuts the lower entrance and sure enough the whole thing wet slabs but he skis above it as it starts to slowly run down Upper. Comes to rest at the Snake entrance bench about 10 feet deep. We subsequently started to learn about avalanches and buy our gear (still use my old Ortovox from '85).

Just a thought as part of the pre-ski routine. That slab reminds me of two other scary days - one in '87 where the same bro cut a very similar slope as in your situation above me and slabbed me while I was in the middle of the slab. Very weird experience to move while the snow around is you is seemingly remaining solid. Then the break up of the slab as I slid with it ultimately leaving me buried to my neck.

Second 90 or so on Rainier in Edith creek area.

Thanks for the information -- I hope your knee and shoulder heal up strong.

Hi Will (and ski party). Thank you for your write up. I am sorry to hear about your accident and i hope you heal up quickly. You and your friends will come away wiser. I wonder how many times i have exhibited the same behavior and gotten away with it? Maybe Lady Luck has been my only defense? Your story spurs some self-reflection on my own decision making and behavior as a group member.
While 3 days in a valley just a little west of you we found conditions that warranted concern and wise travel practices close to ridge lines, steep convex rollers, and other wind affected terrain. Layers of concern were in storm snow and also 2-3 mm buried surface hoar.
Peace

WOW-- glad you made it out alive!

Snowpits are not even close to "everything"..  Lots of observed (or should have) indicators:  lots of new snow; wind slab--lots of wind--cornices tell you where snow has been transported from and to).  With out being a  snow scientist, I know that slabs can form from heat do to the crystals banging together (how is that for non-scientific) --sometimes).  I always ask what are the consequences if I'm wrong (after all you are in charge of your own hypothesis/decision makings..).   

Wind slab can be a very localized thing.  I try to ski test/ cut before I drop in very far and I try to keep in mind who might  be above me and below me including the skin out to the car (good safe route fiinding super important if there is any question of stability--learning to pick up on visual indicators will possibly allow you to trump any pit information suggesting stability).

Lots of pictures out there showing slides in treed areas (questionable about how good trees are for "anchoring"--sometimes that "localized" snow/slab loading happens in trees--I don't really know why though--ok, because it can be a localized thing). 

If you are doing the group thing...one at a time and good vis./watching.  Don't have everybody meet in the exact same spot (somebody has to be able to search if....).

As I recall , the majority of fatalities have occured on slides of something like 500 to 600 feet.  You don't have to be in the big tracks to have problems. 

I always tone it back a bit out in the sticks--lower angle "test" runs make me think I might have an "understanding" of the angle of repose (along with ski cutting of course..).

My two cents...

Thanks for your write-up.. SKI TO LIVE ANOTHER DAY!

Last Sunday we toured over Barometer Mt. in the Baker BC and found very reactive windslabs on NE slopes at 5,500-5,800.  2-3 mm in length of buried surface hoar was the weak layer.  We set off three size 2's by stomping on the ridge top and getting sympathetic realeases 20-30 feet away.  It was a kick to watch them run--and pretty sobering to watch large slabs release on a planar surface.

plus.google.com/u/0/photos/1023155739327.../5849515474472920082

I mentioned to my ski buddies that it would not be surprising if someone were not caught out by the dangerous nature of the localized hazard.  Your incident and one other incident I heard about confirmed the excellent NWAC forecast for Sunday.

My takeaway is to give kudos to NWAC and the superb job they do with their avy forecast.  Read that avy report and have your trip plan reflect sound terrain and elevation choices.  Thanks for posting this story.  We all learn from hearing from others experiences.

Willie,

Thanks for having the initiative to write up your avalanche accident and I hope you recover from your injuries soon. I think you covered the details well and fully understand what happened to you.

Just a couple of points:

Regarding the convexity, the way I look at it is that skiing convexities maximizes the probability of triggering an avalanche; but, in this case given the width of the crown from your photos it may well be that you could have triggered the avalanche from many places along the length of the crown. I think what a couple of others said about ridgelines and wind effects is pertinent. Starting zones need to be treated a little differently than areas farther down in the path.

Greg C mentioned the Avalanche Forecast, and as I recall it snowed on Thursday after a dry period of considerable length and then snowed heavily on Friday, the 23rd. As I recall the NWAC cited widespread instances of instability and avalanche release. I treat these details much like skiers would INFOEX in Canada. I think it is true that one can never get as many personal observations as the sum of knowledge in avalanche forecasts. So, these days I end up digging fewer pits as when it is known to be unstable I just choose less risky terrain. I mostly dig pits for further education, for future considerations, or for curiosities sake, although I do perform many small scale tests of various varieties. Essentially, when it is known to be unstable (or when one would expect that it is as in this case with a long dry period followed by snowfall) I punt and choose safer terrain. Anyway, that is what I do and it seems to work for most of my current skiing companions.

Thanks so much for writing up this happy ending report. We happened to ski the exact same slope just a couple of weeks before, so it hits home hard. I am relatively new to full on backcountry skiing and am very safety conscious. Like you, I don't want to put myself or my friends in danger.

I have a very long background of lift assisted powder skiing. For the last 15 years, I have been skiing the side country in Whistler and Stevens 20-35 days per year. I never owned a beacon until recently. I've always limited my exposure to avalanche danger by waiting for a few days after a large storm and/or by skiing lower angled slopes. I was told to do this by a big mountain patroller many years ago. At Whistler, this is easy to do because there is so much quality in bounds skiing to be had. Before they put in the Symphony Chair, I used to do the long trudge to Flute and back, but only a few days after storms. I also skied the lower angled slopes that very rarely avalanche. I love skiing steep, light powder, but settle for lower angled more consolidated snow, when I am out of bounds.

Since I have been going into the true backcountry lately, and have been active in this group, I have been surprised by the steepness of the slopes everyone seems to regularly ski, and by the fact that waiting periods are replaced by digging pits and going anyway. Everyone (including myself) has shovels, and probes, and beacons, but many don't have the self restraint to stay away for a few days after a big snow - or to at least stay on low angled, safer terrain.

"Fresh snow is only fresh once." I understand the pull of that as much as anyone, and I've often had poor judgement myself. As I continue my backcountry education, I hope that I will continue to have the judgement and restraint to stick to my guns and not put too much trust in my new safety tools. I also think that for those of us that just HAVE to ski the steep and deep, one of those new flotation devices would be a great thing. I'll probably get one myself even though I'm old and conservative and try to only ski when safe.

Glad you are ok. Thanks for reporting this. A lot of us frequent that area and perhaps don't give it the respect we should. I don't have additional advice but the fourth mistake you mentioned is one I think about quite a bit. When is it "ok" to ski over a trigger point? Some one mentioned ski cutting, which is useful, but can lead to some of the same false confidence of digging pits and the obvious lure that trigger points are often fun to ski without a pause for ski cutting. I think this grey area is one of the things that takes a long time to define or perhaps, as someone else mentioned, we get away with because of luck sometimes. Should we not ski likely trigger points until consolidated spring conditions? Or when we are 90% certain about conditions, 80%... ... perhaps not on days with so much new snow. Thanks again for the write up.

Willie, thanks for sharing your story, hope you heal up quickly. The only other observation I would add, and maybe you left it out of your narrative but based on your mistakes list maybe not.
Knowing that there had been high wind and snow fall loading, you and your partners should have acknowledged the extra risk at the start and agreed on an increased margin of safety in all decisions. That may have prevented you from jumping off solo, your crew may have decided to dig an extra pit or two, and like you say you may have backtracked as soon as you realized you were off original track.
Hindsight it 2020, thanks for sharing so we can all learn.

Thanks for all of the input everyone, it's very much appreciated. Ski2fly - your idea of talking about the dangers beforehand, especially on a day like that really makes a lot of sense. If we had talked about it beforehand it would probably have. Been far less likely that we would have made the same mistakes. At least that's how it seems now.

Saw a doc at UW sports medicine today. Initial diagnosis is torn acl. Going back for MRI soon, been referred to another doc that can handle both knee and shoulder. Going to get both fixed so season over for this year. Doc called this my bionic man year.

(((((((Healing))))))))))

Healing vibes sent your way man. Both my son (broken collar bone, heel injury, elbow injury and knee) and I (broken fib, torn labrum > surgery) have worked with a great Ortho in Bellevue who understands sports medicine if at all interested.

...So many injuries in this group - we all know our surgeons on a first name basis...