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Topic: A humbling lesson in avalanches (Read 2654 times)
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brew
1Member
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Posts: 2
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Had a close call a couple of weeks ago that seemed appropriate to share on this thread. We made a number of mistakes that day and it bit us, though fortunately, not too hard. I hope that our mistakes may serve as a lesson to many. Keep it safe out there.
Saturday Jan. 21, 2012
Well, it was an interesting day in the mountains. John and I were touring in the Snoqualmie area and decided on the Phantom. Visibility was poor, so we figured the trees would be a good choice. It is also a predominantly south aspect with lots of options in the trees. NWAC avy forecast was considerable to high. High on the east aspects above 5000ft. We knew that the conditions were not great and that we would need to be especially cautious. Lots of new snow over the last week with lots of wind and a generally warming trend.
We left the trailhead around 9am and headed up the standard route. As we climbed, there were many of the classic red flag warnings present: collapsing snow, shooting cracks, slabs breaking loose on the kick-turns, etc. At 3800 ft, we did a quick ECT with results of a ECT6 Q1 at 20cm depth. Appeared to be the most recent storm sliding on the accumulation from the days before. ECT18 Q2 at 60cm depth. Aspect was SSE ~150deg. We didn't measure the slope angle, but I would guess around 25deg.
At 4300ft, we decided to transition. The propagation was seeming to get worse, and we didn't want to expose ourselves unnecessarily to the open slopes above the tree line. Out of curiosity, we did another quick test. ECT1 Q1 at 20cm depth. ECT11 Q2 at 60cm depth. CT2 Q1 at the 20cm layer. Aspect was SSW ~200deg. Slope angle was roughly 30deg.
Knowing well how unstable the snow pack was, we discussed our strategy before starting our descent: ski safe spot to safe spot, expect it to slide, always have exits planned, avoid convexities, eyes on, communicate, etc. Interestingly, the ski down was great and barely a thing moved.
Success! We were able to use our heads and manage the conditions....but we didn't get much skiing in. The idea of skinning back up was considered, but we didn't really want to press our luck too much. Hmmm...wonder if anyone we know is skiing over at Alpental? Sure enough.
We meet up with Andy and another friend and take a run down Rock something or other in the Alpy backcountry. Skiing was great, so we hopped back on the chair to take one more run. This time, we dropped into the backcountry through the Elevator gate and skied the Meadow, traversing under Elevator Shaft. Just before the Shaft exit, we all gathered. Above us (skier's right) was a short steep slope that lead up to a rock band roughly 15yards above. Where we stood, it was relatively flat with several trees running across the slope. Below the trees was a very steep drop off.
The fourth person to come across the traverse continued along the existing ski track that ran adjacent the trees. Meanwhile, Andy, John, and I saw this pristine snow above us that could probably provide one extra turn on the exit. Wanting to cash in on that extra turn, we start
side-stepping up and across the short slope--all at the same time and probably no more than 15-20ft between the first and last person.
Seconds later, fractures shot across the slope above us.
In the blink of an eye, I found myself partially wrapped around a tree, skis uphill, and buried up to my shoulders.
Realizing that I wasn't going to be getting out of my predicament quickly, I hollered at the others praying that no one was fully buried. To my relief, both Andy and John responded, but the fourth person did not. I knew that she had gone ahead on the ski track, but I did not know how far and if she was caught in the slide.
To cut a long story short, we did a quick beacon check and got a hold of the fourth person by cell phone. All three of us were partially buried, but ultimately were able to self-rescue. I had one arm out above my head and the other arm was close enough to the surface that I was able to move it and start digging out. It took probably 5min for us just to dig ourselves out. Nobody was injured and all but one pole was recovered.
The Debrief
We were idiots. We allowed ourselves to become complacent as soon as we set foot in the resort. Our avalanche minds were turned off and we were thinking of only the skiing--even though we were no longer within the ski area boundary. We never should have put ourselves into this scenario. We all knew better.
Thoughts:
These thoughts are listed in no particular order. Just writing down what comes to mind as I think back through the day's events.
•Shut our brains off
•Knew the danger level well
•Knew that all aspects were generally bad. North aspects expected to be even worse.
•When I left home, I had it in my mind that I would not be skiing on north aspects that day.
•Knew that the instabilities were propagating easily. ECT1 during a prior test that day.
•Lots of people out there skiing. We followed the trend.
•The slope was an ideal slope to slide: Steep, short, against a rock face. We undercut it. Compressive support makes a difference on small slopes.
•There was an existing ski track that we chose to veer off of
•Everybody was in danger at the same time (3 people buried!)
•Because we were all involved, there was no one available to do an immediate rescue should it have been required.
•Happened extremely fast
•Leashes--to wear or not to wear. That morning on the Phantom, I did not attach them, because of the danger level. They were attached when buried and, consequently, even once I was able to release my bindings, I was unable to move because my leashes were short and kept me attached to my skis that had become bomber anchors in the snow.
•The leash/no leash debate is still valid, but a long leash would have certainly been better than short leashes. I will be changing mine.
•In this scenario, the trees served as a collection point and may well have prevented us from going over the ledge below.
•Even a small amount of snow is extremely powerful
•To grab a tree or not. I was very near a tree (~5ft below me) and felt that holding the tree would allow most of the snow to pass by. The snow tended to flow between the trees (duh) and I was not able to get a strong hold on the tree as I fell towards it. I ended up against the tree but between it and the adjacent tree since the snow pulled me through the gap. Had I had body parts on either side of the tree, I very well could have been snapped around it. That said, any snow that moves past you is snow that can't bury you. Given this particular situation, I don't feel that going for the tree was a bad idea and would do the same thing again.
•Crown fracture propagated far. To have been in a safe place to watch during the crossing would have required being quite a long ways from the slope.
•Shit, I may have just won myself an award
•What we did is embarrassing. That said, it turned out very well and was a very cheap lesson. I am a safer person because of it, and I hope that others will learn from our mistakes.
Take home points:
There are many lessons that can be learned from our experience: from group dynamics, to snowpack, to terrain management. However, of all of these lessons, there is really only one that I want to emphasize here:
Never ever expose more than one person at a time. Period.
In this particular situation, yeah, we probably should have known better than to have even triggered the slide, but the biggest mistake we made was having three people exposed to danger at the same time. There was no one available for an immediate rescue should any of us have been fully buried. We were extremely lucky. As you are being buried, it is a very discomforting feeling knowing that both of your partners are also caught in the avalanche. Don't find yourself in this position. Never expose more than one person at a time.
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« Last Edit: 02/12/12, 05:02 PM by brew »
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redshift
5Member
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Posts: 67
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Thanks. Close call indeed...
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Mattski
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Posts: 101
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Great write up and take home lessons, glad you lived to write it.
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Marcus
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Posts: 2236
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Thanks for sharing this guys -- glad you're all right.
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garyabrill
Member
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Posts: 488
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Good write up. Good lessons. I found it especially interesting that you had a good set of test results prior to your avalanche.
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Jonn-E
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Posts: 146
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I am not passing critique, I am just very curious for my own sidecountry decision matrix:
Were the gates open or closed?
<also accepting PMs at this time  >
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