Here's What I Fear

Here’s one of the classic backcountry circumstances that I that tend to fear:

Situation:
A Bluebird day.
Clear as a bell; crisp, cold and a foot or more of light, faceshooting, delectable freshies.
“We’re going to have a rauckin’ good day today!”
It’s early in the season so most of the skinners have not had a chance to check out the snowpack.
But what the hey; we’ll check it out later. First less us track out that lower angle stuff before everyone else get to it.
Wow. That didn’t take long.
Over here’s just a bit steeper and we’ll be able to a bit more speed. Yeah; That’s the ticket!.
Rock on.
Check this over here; Yes!
And… then… oh my God… another Dozen More Turns situation.  No. No, no, no.

So here is what I would like to brainstorm:
I can we allow something like this happen… how, after hours, with some, days or even months and years of study and practice; how can we possibly, after knowing exactly how it happens; how can we allow this to happen?
How does this happen?
And what we can do to reduce the chance of it happen to us?

How can we get ourselves to make better decisions that will help us steer away from Danger’s door in the backcountry?


(Edit to restate and clarify the question.)

Not to worry, Ron. Gaia protects the ignorant. I can't believe the lines I've seen skied even when NWAC said avoid travel in the bc. Around here it is, simply, the odds are no matter what you do/what you ski, it will be o.k. But, of course, we old geezers get more conservative with age (until Alzheimers sets in and we say f@ck it), and less likely to ski prime lines when even avalanche danger is below zero LOL

This is a good subject RonJ!

Here's something I wrote in another thread:

"Why does anyone ignore signs of instability?

Accident formation is a complex phenomenon that arises from the interaction of other complex phenomena. Maybe it starts when you fail to plan a backcountry ski outing because your boss asks you to work late. Maybe it starts when you follow someone else's skin track, unaware that they were overheating and that the shaded route they chose is above a parcel of buried surface hoar. Maybe it starts when you treat a hangover with three 15 minute water breaks and end up descending snow that's been overcooked for 45 minutes.

The chains of cause and effect are so intricate that it's incredibly difficult to actually know what went wrong, and it's rarely one specific thing. We look at accident reports and see what we think are obvious bad choices, but it's hard to know exactly how the party arrived at that point, and it's really hard to know if the patterns we "think" we see are real or if we're just seeing what we want to see. We forget to acknowledge how often we ourselves break the rules and get away it anyway.

Best practises have been established to counter this murkiness, but it's incredibly important to realise that best practises are based on patterns, which are a form of generalisation, and that generalisations must be combined with knowledge about the situation at-hand in order to make safe decisions. You can easily be killed by breaking any of the general rules in Best Practises for Backcountry Skiing, but it's just as easy to be killed by breaking a rule that isn't in the book, or by the collision of factors that the rulebook never anticipated."

***

Here's what I usually do ( except for, as above, where like everyone else, I break the rules and get away with it ):

1. Follow the rules.
2. Employ an extra margin of safety.
3. Make conservative decisions.

Does not protect against "black swan events".

Discuss avys on every tour and try to relate to what you are seeing in terrain, weather, and human factors.

This is key: poke, prod, and palaver on the way up. Staying near someone to chat about conditions, and going at a pace where you can observe and chat, creates a tone where information is noticed and shared. Just yesterday our talk led us to dig a pit and do some quick tests, even though the hazard was moderate to low. That gave us enough info to safely ski a new slope.
Also, following safe descent protocol should be a habit, not condition-dependent: observe each other, leapfrog to islands of safety, stop above rollovers to chat more, etc. It's fun to stay together, makes for better photos, and some of us need to rest anyhow....

And the answer is : Dynamite the slope. Or go ski a controled, groomed run.

Also, following safe descent protocol should be a habit, not condition-dependent:  observe each other, leapfrog to islands of safety, stop above rollovers to chat more, etc.  It's fun to stay together, makes for better photos, and some of us need to rest anyhow....

Well said -- even if decisions on the way up led to "it's safe to ski here" keep your cerebral cortex functioning on the way down -- especially, know where each other are.

Interesting topic.

It is easy to say that you are going to go out and make informed (and conservative?) decisions. It is just as easy to assume that everything is good to go because you get to the top of the skin track and see that other people have skied a slope or because your partners have not expressed concern about that day's conditions.

Are you (all readers) familiar with Ian McCammon's work on heuristic traps? www.snowpit.com/articles/traps%20reprint.pdf

I think he nicely summarizes some of the "traps" that we have all fallen into at some point or another. When I worked in outdoor ed, my co-instructors and I constantly discussed decisions, because it was our job to (try to) not get other people injured. But, when I am out for recreation with friends, I have often been guilty of poor decision making due to poor communication or due to making assumptions about what my partners are thinking. Luckily, I have always gotten away with it.

So, to me it comes down to one thing:

Communication! It starts at the parking lot. Are you on the same page about the day's objectives? And, it continues throughout the day. How do you feel about the conditions? If you think that digging a pit is prudent, say so. If you do not feel entirely comfortable with skiing/riding a line, say so. How many times have you not expressed your thoughts on the avalanche danger because no one else has? I am guilty. Sometimes it seems like everyone else feels good about a situation because no one else has expressed any concerns. But, perhaps everyone in the group is feeling unsure but not speaking up because no one in has spoken about his or her concerns. It can be really hard to take the leadership role in this situation, because you feel like a fun killer. So, start the conversation early. Unless it is your very first time out, you have some experience that you can use to make good judgement, and every group member's opinions have merit.

Wishing everyone a safe and fun season. Go La Nina!

I guess my outlook is a little darker. If we play outside long enough, one day it _will_ kill, or worse, maim us. That's how probability works. There's no silver bullet when it comes to risk.

I try to manage things to give a reasonable expectation of living a hundred years in the backcountry.

At avalanche gatherings like NSAS, I wonder who won't make it to the next one. One of my goals is not to be that guy. Even if we're all really good, and average two hundred years without a backcountry incident each, about one NSAS participant a year will get caught. None of us are immune.

For me, the freedom and beauty of the backcountry are worth it. Most of us will get killed or maimed by something else first. Almost always, a dozen more turns are just that; twelve more human expressions of raw joy, silliness, and grace of being alive.

To directly answer Ron's question: Now that I know what it's like to be broken in the backcountry, the question I ask before dropping in on a suspect pitch is, "Is this slope going to leave me crippled?" Also, if we're all going to die, why hurry it up? .

Days like the one below are worth living for.

This^^^^
Charlie and I rarely agree on things but on this I completely agree with his well written and thoughtful response.

One of the things I enjoy about backcountry skiing is the inherent risk involved .

The days I have been out and been overcautious( you know when you have been) are far less fulfilling that those days when I have been willing to take some risks and got away with it. That's definitely not a PC stance to take in the growing pantheon of armchair avy experts on BC skiing blogs.

One can certainly be undercautious (reckless?), but I'm not sure that one can be overcautious. How would you know if you were being overcautious?

All of us have a different tolerance for risk, but I think most would agree that if your butt never leaves the couch for fear that something might happen to you if you go outside, you are over cautious.

One can certainly be undercautious (reckless?), but I'm not sure that one can be overcautious.  How would you know if you were being overcautious?   

o·ver·cau·tious  (vr-kôshs)
adj.
Excessively cautious; unduly careful.

We're arguing semantics to a degree but I think you can and I certainly know when I have been and come back and wished I'd risked it a bit more and skied the line I wanted to or wish I hadn't backed off .Kinda leaves you unfulfilled.

One of the things I enjoy about backcountry skiing is the inherent risk involved .

So is the same line more satisfying to ski when you believe it might slide?

Sometimes 'goals' and 'plans' are listed as aspects of skiing that need to be considered in relation to avalanche risk. I would like to suggest that more general motivations and skiing philosophy and values should be considered. If one can enjoy, value, and be satisfied by 'safe' skiing, the obvious avalanche risk management strategy is to simply stay away from avalanche terrain when there is significant chance of skier triggered avalanches and only ski steep (steep enough to slide) terrain in times of good stability.

I think that if recreational skiers took a little time to ponder why they are skiing (where and when they are) it would help put snow stability assessments in a more clear light.

And what we can do to reduce the chance of it happen to us?

My answer: figure out if you are a meadow skipper or TGR shredder. If the former, find suitable partners and terrain for low-adrenaline fun in iffy conditions; save the tempting slopes for the frequent periods of good stability a coastal snowpack offers. If the latter, get enough knowledge so that your risk decisions are well informed (and, as Charlie pointed out above, accept the inevitable accidents associated with the assumed risk).

I think this is a great discussion for this community.

So is the same line more satisfying to ski when you believe it might slide?

It's certainly more satisfying  (for me) to use my knowledge and experience (moderate as it is) to push as close as you believe you can ( stability wise)to the limits and ski a nice line and get away with it.

What's wrong with enjoying the inherent risk and the  process of trying to manage it as best I can.
I may have developed a slightly higher risk tolerance for avy risk over the years and an acceptance of the possible consequences whereas steep skiing on hard snow still scares me shitless and I avoid it at all costs.

That's what I don't really understand.....people( and I'm generalizing) on sites like this tend to be very critical of individuals that have a higher avy risk tolerance. How many posts have there been condemning and castigating people for going out on high or considerable days, and stuff like that etc.........LOTS, whereas skiing steep, icy, fall you die terrain is usually revered and oohed and aahed( as it should). Seems like a double standard in some respects......why is that????

1. Insufficient discipline.
2. Surplus ego.

Scotsman raises an interesting point.

It's perfectly acceptable to preserve risk in order to engage in skiing that is more exciting than what you might find at the ski area.

The question becomes... what is an unacceptable risk?

One definition: risk is unacceptable if there is a significant chance of triggering an avalanche >= Size 2.

Personally I've been in 3 avalanches that could have killed, one that should have. Two of the three avalanches were in ski areas and I was not avalanche savvy enough at the time. But the 3rd....was in 1998. I have to chalk that one up to cumulative risk. That year I was skiing a lot of big scale alpine terrain and although each decision I made at the time for the choice of ski terrain was probably pretty good; the one that got me was such a complex and highly variable situation that although I understand what happened, I still couldn't avoid it if I put myself in the same situation again. It wasn't super steep, the slope that slid was 30-35 degrees in angle, but distinctly alpine. The avalanche hazard on the day was low below 7000' (although our avalanche was at 7900') and I suspect it was the only large avalanche in the Cascades that day; it was a 4' slab, and carried me 1/2 mile and 1500 vft. I was under the snow for perhaps one to one and one-half minutes, deep enough that it was pretty dark. Cumulative risk....

I interviewed Joe Firey one time. You know he back country skied for 50 years or so without any significant incidents. He was a pioneer in skiing the BC Coast Mountains.

Joe said, "you know you can get a lot of really good skiing without skiing steep slopes.

50 years of cumulative risk pioneering routes in the Coast Range without an incident is quite a record.......he was obviously
1. Extremely good at avy risk assessment.
2. Very conservative.

Most of the really hard core "skiers" I know have been in a significant slide or even two or even three!
I use the term "skier" here as opposed to" tourer" to describe people who are not out in the BC to  just enjoy the views and tour ( which they do) but whose emphasis is also on getting some good downhill action. Their risk tolerance for avalanches is obviously higher and in all cases from my personal observations they are very knowledgeable about the snowpack. Whats gets them is probability. Probability says if you ski slopes > 35 deg regularly, even with good risk assessment and judgement, eventually you are going to mess up. They seem to accept that risk  and enjoy what they do.

I also know a lot of hard core"tourers" who have never had an incident because their emphasis is  on a having a nice day in the mountains and some exercise and will only ski slopes  < 25% when the avy hazard goes above moderate. They seem to accept the limitation to their skiing and enjoy what they do.

I admire both although to be honest I personally admire the " skier" more even if they have had some avy incidents but I'm probably in the minority and it's based upon my personal value system which may be different from yours.

A lot of the armchair avy experts on ski websites like this will consider the former to have insufficient discipline and surplus of ego and consider the latter paragons of virtue. Just my observation and I find it interesting and I'm trying to figure out why?

Edit to Add: Immediately after writing the above I read Lowell Skoog's avalanche hindsight post which related to the acceptance heuristic trap and I think I know why now. Most of the the people I describe in the first group don't post trip reports, don't give a flying fig what TAYers think about them and their actions and don't crave acceptance by others of their actions, ski wise. I think Lowell's post is dead on although the lesson for me is diametrically opposite of the one Lowell was presenting( naturally) namely I'm probably never going to make a decision primarily based upon what others will think if it turns out bad.

It also partly explains why people on websites like this are quick to point pass judgement so quickly on the perceived faults of others( avy wise) like the guy with 5 posts decrying Freebird for skiing a slope two at time recently and many more ad nauseum on TAY. They crave acceptance of others based upon the norm at TAY which is to revere the conservative tourer who has an abundance of caution avalanche wise.

What is interesting is the situation seems to be reversed in terms of very steep ballsy hard snow skiing and fall you die skiing TR's on TAY. You rarely( if ever) see anybody saying that these guys are off their heads, showing poor judgement or that it's just a matter of time before they make a mistake and fall to their deaths or critiquing their skills, ego or disciple. To be fair Lowell did once when he expressed and opinion that there was a morality issue associated with that type of skiing ( over which we argued as I objected to the term morality).

^^^^Could you distill this down to some concise points or questions relevant to the thread?  Thanks.

You make some interesting statements but I'm having a hard time understanding how they fit in.

On the eve before the battle the young samurai asked the older swordsman what he must face, in Akira Kurosawa’s film The Seven Samurai. The experienced warrior of many battles explained.
“You must accept the fact that you will die and fight as well as you can. Knowing he is going to die anyway, a samurai must give a good showing of himself. If he lives, then he fought well.”
“What is the true spirit of the samurai?” This question was asked of the ronin Lone Wolf after defeating another in a duel in the Japanese film Shogun Assassin. After a moments reflection he responds.
“It is to stay alive when death is certain.”
In his acceptance of death the samurai finds peace and with peace there is no fear. The mind is empty. Without fear or doubt the warrior is free to fight with all of his skill and spirit.

Thought I'd throw this in here, because I was enjoying Scotsman's take on things. Literally the skier is no samurai, but have you ever especially when soloing on steep terrain known this feeling?

They crave acceptance of others based upon the norm at TAY which is to revere the conservative tourer who has an abundance of caution avalanche wise.

Chris, although I admire your tendancy to stir the pot and stimulate creative thinking, I don't think most TAYer's motivation for encouraging safety is because they "crave acceptance of others". I think the primary motivation is to minimize the number of friends that perish in the mountains. If I had to choose between a community that revered risk-taking and a community that revered caution, I would chose a community that revered caution. This is reflected in the ski partners that I choose. Clearly, we all want our ski partners to return from the mountains safely, but if one of them did not, I could live with myself better knowing that we as a community encouraged them to be safe rather than to take risks.

how, after hours, with some, days or even months and years of study and practice; how can we possibly, after knowing exactly how it happens; how can we allow this to happen?
How does this happen?
And what we can do to reduce the chance of it happen to us?
(Edit to restate and clarify the question.)

Great topic.
A) I would take issue with the phrasing "after knowing exactly how it happens". We don't know exactly how it happens... from both a snow-science and psychological perspective. We have some good ideas and theories, but KNOW we do not, especially on an individual level. As a community we do have a better understanding.
"There are no whole truths; all truths are half-truths. It is trying to treat them as whole truths that plays the devil." Alfred North Whitehead.
I realize that it may seem that point A) is nitpicking the question, but I think the fact that the specific phrasing was used points to an underlying reason for many accidents: Humans are overconfident in their knowledge and decision making abilities.
There are many psychological studies that document this. If we were to ask everyone on this forum to rate their avy knowledge and decision making ability, I would venture to guess that the majority would answer "Above average"... Or, maybe people are more realistic about their avi knowledge and decision making abilities. But if we were to ask about intelligence, I'm sure the average response would be "Above average." I'm sure we are all intelligent enough to understand the implication of such a result.
In short, I think overconfidence is a driving factor in many avalanche incidents.

So what do we do? Here are some ideas, some steps in the right direction.
A) We remain humble.
Accept the fact that you will make poor decisions and mistakes every time you go out. You just don't make enough mistakes or large enough mistakes to have a serous incident (this gets back to Lowell's comment about series of mistakes (Many accidents are not the result of a single misfortune, but instead are the end result of a chain of mistakes. You overslept, forgot an important piece of gear, got in a hurry, made a route finding error, got benighted, and eventually had an accident. Recognizing a chain when you're in it--but before it goes bad--is another valuable skill. -Lowell Skoog see here ) I hate to break the news, but the fact someone has never been caught in a slide is not evidence of perfect decision making.
C) Recognize the role of chance, luck, chaos, whatever you call it and that there is ALWAYS a level of UNCERTAINTY, no matter how good you think you are (or actually are).

Rod Newcomb related a story about Ed LaChapelle (I think) at this year's NSAS. Ed said he assumed he was wrong 50% of the time... that's coming from one of the most influential avalanche researchers that has lived. So us mere mortals might assume a 25% accuracy rate?

I think the questions that kicked off this topic is at the core of avalanche education and accident prevention. This is exactly the type of discussion this thread is designed for. Thanks.

50 years of cumulative risk pioneering routes in the Coast Range without an incident is quite a record.......he was obviously
1. Extremely good at avy risk assessment.
2. Very conservative.

I skied with Joe's (Firey) group once in the BC Coast Mountains and we did ski one or two steep slopes but mostly we were skiing.....not out for an adrenalin rush.

I have another friend whose skied about 30-35 years with many days in the Rockies and Selkirks. After a serious accident he stopped skiing with one partner who was the one involved in the accident because he considered that fellow too risky. That individual was subsequenly killed in another avalanche.

For those who don't know who Joe Firey is, look here:

mountaineers.org/NWMJ/08/081_Firey1.html

In my conversations with Joe and others of his generation, I think it's accurate to say that they felt that avalanche danger was very hard to predict, and that one's ability to accurately assess the danger was very limited. So, they adopted practices that kept their exposure to this (largely unknown) danger low.

My generation, which started backcountry skiing in the 1970s and 1980s, had more information and new tools like avalanche beacons. I think we were more willing to venture into potentially risky conditions, but were still (for me at least) pretty conservative.

My impression is that today's generation of skiers has a pretty high assessment of their ability to distinguish between safe and unsafe conditions. Detailed avalanche forecasts, instant condition reports, and a battery of new stability analysis tools lead us to believe that we can diagnose the "gray area" with ever greater precision.

But can we really? I think we have acquired better tools to evaluate risk. But I think that desire and human nature have outstripped the tools so we're not any safer than generations that went before. If you've been in more than one avalanche in the past, say, five to ten years, you're probably rolling the dice.

As usual Lowell, I think your post has a lot of insight.

My impression is that today's generation of skiers has a pretty high assessment of their ability to distinguish between safe and unsafe conditions. Detailed avalanche forecasts, instant condition reports, and a battery of new stability analysis tools lead us to believe that we can diagnose the "gray area" with ever greater precision.

My feeling is that it is more accurate to describe "today's generation" as less willing to settle for safe skiing than more confident regarding stability assessment. I think that due to the natural progression of the sport (both in terms of average skier ability and equipment developments) there is a growing population that feels that skiing outside avalanche terrain is not fulfilling and not what they are out there to do. The terrain must be steep to be interesting (or, as Scotsman mentioned above, the avalanche risk is part of the draw). It's a cultural change from risk aversion to risk affinity. Not to say that people didn't take a lot of risks back in the day, I just think they took longer to work up to them.

There are risk takers in all age groups. New technology helps people push the limits in many areas of life. Is sisal rope a good choice for glacier travel? Of course not, but that was what people used. The blade of technology cuts both ways.

In my conversations with Joe and others of his generation, I think it's accurate to say that they felt that avalanche danger was very hard to predict, and that one's ability to accurately assess the danger was very limited. So, they adopted practices that kept their exposure to this (largely unknown) danger low.

If you haven't already, you should read about the history of avalanche forecasting. ParksCanada has some fascinating materials. Here is a wonderful paper from ISSW 2002:

arc.lib.montana.edu/snow-science/objects/issw-2002-208-220.pdf

Did Joe Firey have any formal training? Without at least some training, it certainly is difficult to assess avalanche danger.

My generation, which started backcountry skiing in the 1970s and 1980s, had more information and new tools like avalanche beacons. I think we were more willing to venture into potentially risky conditions, but were still (for me at least) pretty conservative.

The history of mountaineering, a subject with which you almost certainly have more familiarity than me, is literally stuffed to the gills with stories of adventurous folks, many who died ( and many who didn't ) during serious expeditions to incredibly dangerous terrain. The early Himalaya expeditions come to mind. Is this what you mean by "more conservative", because I think it's really an individual thing rather than generational.

For example: Chris Bonington, who made the first ascent of the south face of Annapurna, isn't exactly a young man. He wrote two incredible books about his expeditions to Everest and Annapurna.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chris_Bonington

What about Reinhold Messner:

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reinhold_Messner

***

I'm not sure that the facts necessarily align with all the opinions. Again, risk acceptance IS NOT generational.

My feeling is that it is more accurate to describe "today's generation" as less willing to settle for safe skiing than more confident regarding stability assessment. I think that due to the natural progression of the sport (both in terms of average skier ability and equipment developments) there is a growing population that feels that skiing outside avalanche terrain is not fulfilling and not what they are out there to do. The terrain must be steep to be interesting (or, as Scotsman mentioned above, the avalanche risk is part of the draw). It's a cultural change from risk aversion to risk affinity. Not to say that people didn't take a lot of risks back in the day, I just think they took longer to work up to them.

In the sixties, my parents read all the "mountain porn" of the day and they went straight to Chamonix, where they climbed Mont Blanc on their honeymoon. ( Chamonix is called the "death sport" capitol of the world. ) In Chamonix they were surrounded by similar folks, all risk takers, quite a few of whom died. I won't reveal my parents ages, but my father is probably old enough to be Lowell's father.

Again, I don't think the facts match the opinions.

Cool honeymoon!

Is it your supposition that the riskiness of the terrain choices of typical backcountry skiers in western North America has remained about the same over the last century? When I said I thought people were making more risky choices, I was thinking of the influence on the culture of backcountry skiing of resort skiers migrating further and more frequently out of bounds. I think many factors, including movies and the availability of better AT gear, have drawn a lot of talented hard chargers further out of bounds. I think these people bring their high aspirations (and associated necessary risk assumption) with them.

I think the story is completely different in mountaineering.

Again, risk acceptance IS NOT generational.

I agree that human nature does not change. But the factors that animate human nature do change.

Behavior in risky situations is the result of balancing two key factors, risk and reward.  Both risk assessment and reward are subjective.  The subjective assessment of these factors can and does change.  I believe that it has changed.

As Martin Volken explained at NSAS a while back, risk assessment involves a calculation of likelihood versus consequences.  If the likelihood of an avalanche is high, then the consequences better be low.  Conversely, if the consequences are high, then the likelihood better be low.  A key question becomes: How accurate is your calculation?  Do you have a high degree of confidence in your assessment of the risk, or are you highly uncertain?  My feeling is that the degree of confidence within the backcountry skiing community has grown over the past 50 years due to more information available and to more refined stability assessment tools. As I mentioned in my previous post, I'm not convinced that this level of confidence is completely justified.

The second key factor is reward.  Reward can be internal or external.  Internal rewards include the enjoyment of skiing deep snow on steeper slopes.  This reward has become vastly more accessible due to the improvements in backcountry ski gear in the past 20 years.  People have not suddenly become better skiers.  Instead, the sport has become easier due to better gear.  External rewards include the social factors that make backcountry skiing enjoyable, whether the intimate experiences of close friends or the less personal, but still powerful, interactions with the larger community.

In my view, both factors--risk assessment and rewards--have changed in ways that lead today's skiers to accept risks that previous skiers would have been less likely to accept.  This is exactly what Micah wrote:

My feeling is that it is more accurate to  describe "today's generation"  as less willing to settle for safe skiing than more confident regarding stability assessment.