Avalanche kills person near Mount Baker ski area

Also, from experience, I can say that it's way too soon to be talking seriously about healing.

Totally agreed. I know I'd feel pressured to chime in publicly if analysis were beginning regarding an accident in which I'd been involved. We can minimize that feeling for those involved.

With an accident in 2009, I didn't really understand the entire thing until after ~7-10 days of reflection. I wrote the story down in the Percocet haze, but waited to more than a month to speak out. (Afterward, Lowell's analysis was spot on.)

This accident is far more grave, and the impacts much greater.

This is tragic news to hear and very sobering as I ski in the same area frequently and given the whole circumstances of the event think I probably would have made the same decision as they did to traverse under widowmaker to get to the parking lot as quickly and easily as possible.

The image of widowmaker posted here likely shows where the avalanche started but one can't see the traverse they were most likely doing. It's steep and shitty but not nearly as steep as the spines of widowmaker you can see in the picture where the slide likely started. It all ends up in the bagley creek drainage which at that spot is a pretty major terrain trap.

I've done that traverse once before in locked up conditions. The only reason it's worth doing is because all other options that avoid going under widowmaker require at least 500 vert of additional skinning to get to the parking lot whereas that traverse puts you 100 vertical ft directly beneath the parking lot. In the case of an injury that warranted calling 911 I can certainly see myself choosing to go under widdowmaker in the conditions NWAC described for that day rather than adding an additional climb to get to medical attention.

Tragic situation. Condolences to those who knew the victim and are grieving.

Lowell, the basic name for the cascade of events that leads to a mishap is called the "swiss cheese" model. It is not only an aviation reference. The same analogy is also used in other professions like the medical field. If you ever want to discuss let me know.

NAS Whidbey posted to Facebook regarding this incident. This link appears to work for me while signed in to Facebook, but not when I'm not .

www.facebook.com/NASWhidbeyIsland/posts/942835245787456

I was up there that day and saw the party ski by us in Corona Bowl.  To understand the reports it's important to know that most skiers local to Baker refer to the false summit as "Herman".  I suspect that a lot of them don't even realize that the true summit is across another bowl and up a ridge.  Skiers that are trying to look at a map and find the location based on the description seem to be confused.  The actual face that slid is lower down on the NE ridge that's coming off the false summit that is SE of the main summit. Here is a link that is centered on the slope.  Zoom out to orient yourself once you click the link.
goo.gl/maps/YpmpXEeAwE32

Lowell is spot on, there was more than one issue/mistake/failure in the process that occurred during their tour.  From what I was told on Sunday and what it says in the reports since then, they were dealing with an injury that might have distracted them from looking around and certainly hindered their travel.  From what I was told there was no way they were going to skin back up anything.  They also suffered from truly tragic timing as a glide avalanche is not very common and is very hard to predict timing with much certainty.  It's very different from a typical winter time slide.  That face has a history of similar slides but I don't think that would be very well known to most skiers in the area.

Alecapone, there is a more moderate ski line than is shown but there is no way to cross that slope without exposure to hazard.  Crossing that slope slowly increases the exposure to dangerous conditions.  It's not too different from crossing under a serac.

All of the early talk about a possible persistent weak layer was misguided.  My experience in the backcountry on Sunday matched the NWAC report pretty spot on.  We saw lots of very active but very isolated small pockets of wind slab.  Most were ~10' round patches between wind scoured rain crust and the moving snow wouldn't have caused any issues on it's own but had the potential to knock someone down on the boot supporting crust.  If you had found yourself sliding on the crust a recovery would have been difficult but that's not specifically an avalanche problem.  We had actually discussed baling the way they did if we found the crust to be impossible to pass on our way to go out the way the party came in to the bowl where we crossed paths.  That said, I feel like NWAC has been generally posting danger ratings one level lower than what they describe in their "Bottomline" description.

Craig Panthen composed himself to share the story of the events surrounding the avalanche that took his brother's, Mark Panthen's, life last Sunday. So many pieces of the story that made the news cycle missed what actually happened. Craig allows us the understanding of the sequence of events as they unfolded on the slopes of Mt Herman.

www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbi...&fref=nf&pnref=story

If you have not already done so and feel so compelled, please consider helping Mark's and Amanda Peart's family through the Mark Panthen Memorial Fund: www.youcaring.com/markpanthenmemorialfund

Thank you.

Additional Info.  Amazing effort by local SAR resources.

NAS Whidbey Island SAR Facebook Post

Craig Panthen composed himself to share the story of the events surrounding the avalanche that took his brother's, Mark Panthen's, life last Sunday. So many pieces of the story that made the news cycle missed what actually happened. Craig allows us the understanding of the sequence of events as they unfolded on the slopes of Mt Herman.

www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbi...&fref=nf&pnref=story

Thanks for posting this link. Such a difficult time.

The ice avalanche that hit them could not have been predicted well at all.

They were trying to self-rescue, and that is something I think we all regard as a virtue.

In addition to family and friends, I send my thoughts to the ski patrol and other rescuers whose efforts were stymied.

Yes, thanks for posting, and ditto to the rest of what Lowell wrote. And good luck with the memorial fund, as well as with getting on with your suddenly-changed lives.

I'll be interested to read the report that I assume will eventually be posted by NWAC - if anything I'm not more confused than ever by the various descriptions, as the run down from Herman Saddle and the Mazama Bowl access notch is nowhere near nor in view of the parking lot (at least the features we've always used those names for) or what folks here have described as the Widowmaker run. But there's no rush and clear and carefully compiled facts beat internet speculation.

I can't get onto FB from work so I don't know what the brother's account is but I was up there and saw them.

My best guess at their route that day:
Early start from the parking lot to Bagley Bowl and accessing Mazama Bowl somehow, probably the usual low point between Herman and Mazama Dome.
100% guess, too many other tracks to know which were theirs.
Skinned east out of Mazama Bowl to the high notch.
I believe this based on the fact that they had the only downhill tracks east of the high notch and we had the only skin track east of the high notch. The party I was in had the only downhill tracks west of the high notch. I saw a slightly snowed over skin track that was only a couple of hours old climbing from Mazama Bowl to the notch. All of the other skiers in Mazama Bowl were farming turns in the north facing slope in the middle of the bowl.
Skied from the high notch to the moraine in Corona Bowl.
I know this because I watched them do it. One of them caught some air on a wind lip near the moraine, maybe intentional, probably an accident in the flat light. He fell and picked himself up while we were peeling skins on the false summit at ~1115.
They continued north east from there towards the entrance into the face that slid on them. They were gone before we got to the moraine so we didn't talk at all but I watched them ski by.

We continued out through Mazama Bowl and Bagley Bowl (where we saw the Navy SAR heli) back to the parking lot. I talked to MSAR and patrol, told them that I saw the party and when and asked them what was going on.

It shook us up pretty good since we had talked about retreating out the same way if we couldn't get to the saddle into Mazama Bowl.

My sincerest condolences to the family and friends.

I'm waiting to see the official, properly informed, analysis, but curiosity's hard to quash entirely.

I've barely skied the Baker BC, just ~six trips or so, but from photos people have posted, it sounds like the slide path is where I've labelled "Spot 2" on this map. I've refrained from using the path name because it seems too apropos at present.

caltopo.com/m/5M86

The edit password is "TAY"; do feel free to improve the map however you wish. To edit, click on the "Read-only" link, and it'll let you enter a password.

I've made a few updates to the link that includes where I was standing when I saw the two skiers, where I saw tracks, and where the wind lip was that I saw one of them fall. The shading on WM and the start points are close enough for the conversation here.

Thanks Jason - that FB description spoke of skiing out from "Herman Saddle" , getting injured below, and making their way back from there, which is what confused me. Your description and sketch seems more consistent with what eyewitnesses in parking lot shared in terms of locations.

if anything I'm not more confused than ever by the various descriptions, as the run down from Herman Saddle and the Mazama Bowl access notch is nowhere near nor in view of the parking lot (at least the features we've always used those names for) or what folks here have described as the Widowmaker run.

I'm totally confused by this as well. Unless there's another "Herman saddle"? I await the NWAC report.

So sad for his family and especially his young kids.

The Canadian Avalanche Association Journal (I think in a 2012 or 2013 issue) has descriptions of the terrific prediction difficulty and massive destructive potential of glide slab avalanches from the director of the avalanche control program in Terrace, BC. From an etiologic standpoint, glide slab seems to have relevance to this tragic accident though I certainly may be off the mark.

media.nwac.us.s3.amazonaws.com/media/fil...fatality_1-24-16.pdf

Full Accident report. Injuries were not due to burial, but trauma. Both victims sustained head injuries. I am curious to know if either victim had helmets on during the incident.